When the new lightsport rules were introduced in January 2010, there were 3500 registered ultralight instructors across the United States. In less than four years, only 48 professional instructors (~ 1%) remain in the industry. Some aircraft types have essentially zero instructors or legally eligible aircraft to instruct with. While the reasons for this drastic drop are multiple (including the economy & loss of hobby instructors)-- the drop is none the less shocking and results in an unsustainable condition for the sport.  What the Wright Brothers gave birth to in experimental light aircraft in the U.S., and Burt Rutan and many others continued, is being driven extinct by legislation.  Regardless of cause, it must be addressed.
 
Of all the changes that the LightSport rules brought, the requirement to instruct with only S-LSA aircraft arguably caused the most damage.  With this provision, the myriad of instructors who were formerly available and able to reasonably price themselves (using ~$25,000 aircraft), were forced to immediately purchase new nearly identical aircraft starting at nearly double the cost.  As noted by the overwhelming statistics, the vast majority of instructors were unable to make the change and still stay open to a public interested in entry level flying.  As a consequence, prospective students now must not only pay higher instruction rates, but also spend additional time & money driving across the state (or states) to obtain instruction.  With the downturn in the economy the previously reasonably priced light aircraft market should have faired well, or possibly better (especially with fuel prices & maintenance costs for larger/older aircraft sky rocketed).  Instead, with SLSA it was driven to collapse. 
 
There is no empirical evidence to support SLSA aircraft being any safer or having less incidents than similar ELSA aircraft, rather this policy has simply retarded the pathway into aviation for recreational pilots and the accumulative total number of hours flown. The policy has not made flying safer and in certain situations or aircraft classes, it has made flying more dangerous. For example, lightweight SLSA certified trainer aircraft most similar to what a Part-103 prospective pilot would like to train in became non-existant--  in general, SLSA trainers became larger and heavier.  The gap then for a 103 student pilot to transition from a larger heavier faster SLSA aircraft to his desired single seat 103 was much larger, and he would be making that transition alone (single seat).  Due to the heavy loss of instructors & additional costs, many students of ELSA / SLSA & 103 have been tempted (or forced) to do it on their own-- often with the disastrous results of no or incomplete (unable to fully afford) instruction.  Paralleling the loss of affordable instructors was the loss of maintenance personnel knowledgeable in these types of aircraft- an unfortunate & poignant example of this lack of knowledge of aircraft type is the crash by a mechanic in a hangar on 6/5/14 at Saratoga County Airport.  This was likely simple lack of familiarity with brake controls & kill switch on WSC craft.  Nearly all WSC pilots face this lack of knowledge from these new mechanics on their aircraft and subsequent lack of confidence in their inspections.  Compounding these safety concerns, the severe restrictions on modification of SLSA has forced many SLSA owners to avoid the legal pathways of maintenance and inspection or fly less safe with known inferior equipment (an add on GPS for example must have a letter of authorization (essentially transferring liability) from the manufacturer.)  We have to remember that Experimental craft formed the backbone of the US dominance in the industry-- from the Wright Brothers, to Burt Rutan, many now common critical components (such as glass panels) were first, primarily, or heavily influenced by experimental design.  Eliminating that test bed industry reduces safety and kills innovation.
 
In the Pre-2010 era, for some manufacturers, the chance to influence the rules of an industry may have seemed like a golden opportunity.  An entire fleet of ELSA aircraft would have to be exchanged for similar but brand-new SLSA aircraft.  The potential sales must have seemed enormous.  As seen however, the actual sales to convert an instruction fleet were disastrous.  We now realize that the involvement of a few industry insiders (manufacturers) in the sport, working exclusively (without sufficient public transparency & input) with the FAA to create rules that would ultimately radically change and nearly decimate the sport was not in anyone's best interest (even their own).
As revision of Lightsport rules via FAA 610 is now being discussed, we, the actual participant pilots of the sport, ask that input from the public be widely sought and significant efforts at transparency made.  At the same time, the inherent severe conflict of interest resulting from having a small work group mostly composed of non-elected industry (manufacturer and sales) insiders is untenable and shown to have adverse affects on the sport.  We would like broad participant representation and we would like to choose those who represent us in these negotiations to repair this industry which is just waiting to spring to life given the proper environment.